

National Security Council Files

1943 Middle East War, 1 Nov. - 11 Nov., 1943 — File No. 27

(6)

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
1	reports	Situation Reports	11/1-6/73	B
2	telegram	Amemb Rabat to Sec State	11/6/73	B
3	telegram	Amemb Tehran to Sec State	11/5/73	B
4	memo	Middle East Spot Report	11/3/73	B
5	briefs	re: Soviet Airlift Flights	11/1-3/73	B
FILE GROUP TITLE NSC			BOX NUMBER 1176	
FOLDER TITLE (6)				

RESTRICTION CODES

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Operations Center

MIDDLE EAST TASK FORCE
Situation Report # 104

Situation Report in the Middle East as of 1530 EST, 11/9/73

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DOD (LDX)
CIA (LDX)
NSA (LDX)
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Attached is Middle East Task Force Situation Report
number 104, which was cabled to the Secretary's party.

APPROVED BY:

Regina M. E. C.
Deputy Director for Operations

SECRET/EXDIS
GDS - DECLASS Dec. 31, 1981

FORM DS 322(OCR)

SECRET

NEA TASK FORCE: EPDJEREJIAN:EW
11/9/73 EXT. 29380
NEA TASK FORCE: FMDICKMAN

S/S-O: RELTZ

IMMEDIATE ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS,
NOUAKCHOTT IMMEDIATE, XMPT KAMPALA

EXDIS TOSEC

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, XF
SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST SITUATION NO. 104

FMD 47
EPD 47
S/S: 10

ISLAMABAD FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY
INFORM CONSULS
VIENNA PASS USDEL MBFR
KUWAIT POUCH MUSCAT AND DOHA
BEIRUT PASS BAGHDAD
COAST GUARD FOR POLAD

1. MILITARY SITUATION: A SERIOUS BREACH OF THE CEASEFIRE DURING MORNING NOVEMBER 9 WAS REPORTED BY BOTH ISRAELIS AND EGYPTIANS. IDF SPOKESMAN ANNOUNCED THAT AN IAF AIRCRAFT ON PATROL MISSION OVER FRONT LINES IN SUEZ CANAL SECTOR SHOT DOWN BY EGYPTIAN GROUND-TO-AIR MISSILE NEAR AREA HELD BY EGYPTIAN SECOND ARMY ON NORTHERN SECTOR OF SUEZ CANAL BETWEEN KANTARA AND ISMAILIA. AIRCRAFT CREW WAS SEEN PARACHUTING INTO EGYPTIAN CONTROLLED AREA AND NAMES OF CREW GIVEN TO ICRC. EGYPTIAN SPOKESMAN STATED TWO ISRAELI PHANTOM JETS WERE SHOT DOWN BY EGYPTIAN AIR DEFENSES WHEN THEY TRIED TO ATTACK EGYPTIAN POSITIONS WEST OF SUEZ CANAL. ACCORDING TO EGYPTIAN REPORT, TWO PILOTS WERE CAPTURED WITH ONE IN SERIOUS CONDITION. NO LOSSES REPORTED ON EGYPTIAN SIDE. ALSO A SENIOR IDF OFFICER STATED THAT ELEMENTS OF EGYPTIAN THIRD ARMY TRIED TO ADVANCE IN AL-JIDI AREA DURING NIGHT NOVEMBER 8 BUT SUBSEQUENTLY WITHDREW. ON SYRIAN FRONT ISRAELI SPOKESMAN SAID SYRIAN TROOPS REPEATEDLY

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OPENED FIRE AT ISRAELI PATROLS WITH SMALL ARMS AND SPORADIC ARTILLERY FIRE DURING A THREE-HOUR SPAN DURING THE MORNING. ISRAELIS ANSWERED WITH SMALL ARMS FIRE AND NO CASUALTIES REPORTED. THERE ARE ALSO REPORTS OF ISRAELI ARTILLERY FIRE AGAINST UNSPECIFIED TARGETS IN LEBANESE TERRITORY ON NOVEMBER 9. LEBANESE HAVE COMPLAINED THAT SEVERAL VILLAGES WERE HIT BUT THERE ARE NO REPORTED CASUALTIES.

2. ISRAELI/EGYPTIAN AGREEMENT. TEXT OF SECRETARY KISSINGER'S LETTER TO UNSYG WALDHEIM LISTING SIX-POINT ISRAELI/EGYPTIAN AGREEMENT RELEASED MORNING NOVEMBER 9 AND STATED REPRESENTATIVES OF ISRAEL AND EGYPT WOULD MEET ON CAIRO-SUEZ ROAD ON NOVEMBER 10 OR AT OTHER MUTUALLY CONVENIENT TIME TO SIGN AGREEMENT. TEXT OF AGREEMENT AS GIVEN IN SECRETARY'S LETTER TO WALDHEIM INCLUDE FOLLOWING POINTS: A) EGYPT AND ISRAEL AGREE TO OBSERVE SCRUPULOUSLY THE CEASEFIRE CALLED FOR BY THE UNSC, B) BOTH SIDES AGREE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THEM WILL BEGIN IMMEDIATELY TO SETTLE QUESTION OF RETURN TO OCTOBER 22 POSITIONS IN FRAMEWORK OF AGREEMENT OF DISENGAGEMENT AND SEPARATION OF FORCES UNDER AUSPICES OF THE U.N., C) TOWN OF SUEZ WILL RECEIVE DAILY SUPPLIES, FOOD, WATER AND MEDICINE. ALL WOUNDED CIVILIANS IN THE TOWN OF SUEZ WILL BE EVACUATED, D) THERE SHALL BE NO IMPEDIMENT TO THE MOVEMENT OF NONMILITARY SUPPLIES TO EAST BANK, E) ISRAELI CHECKPOINTS ON CAIRO-SUEZ ROAD WILL BE REPLACED BY U.N. CHECK POINTS. AT SUEZ END OF THE ROAD, ISRAELI OFFICERS CAN PARTICIPATE WITH U.N. TO SUPERVISE NONMILITARY NATURE OF CARGO AT THE BANK OF THE CANAL, F) AS SOON AS U.N. CHECK POINTS ARE ESTABLISHED ON CAIRO-SUEZ ROAD, THERE WILL BE AN EXCHANGE OF ALL POWS, INCLUDING WOUNDED. MEANWHILE, WIRE STORIES MENTION THAT THERE MAY BE SOME LAST MINUTE HITCHES OVER OMISSION OF REPORTED EGYPTIAN CONCESSION TO LIFT BLOCKADE OF BAB EL MANDEB STRAITS ON SOUTHERN ENTRANCE TO RED SEA. WIRE STORIES SPECULATE THAT ABSENCE OF ANY ISRAELI GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCEMENT OF AGREEMENT IS DUE TO LAST MINUTE DIFFICULTIES ABOUT ITS WORDING AND THAT ISRAELI ANNOUNCEMENT ON AGREEMENT WILL BE MADE ONLY AFTER SPECIAL CABINET MEETING NOVEMBER 9. ONE PRESS REPORT STATES THAT ISRAEL IS DEMANDING AN ANNOUNCEMENT FROM CAIRO THAT EGYPT IS LIFTING BLOCKADE OF BAB EL MANDEB AND THAT EGYPT HAS SAID SINCE IT NEVER ANNOUNCED BLOCKADE IT CANNOT SAY IT NO LONGER EXISTS.

3. UNEF AIRLIFT: THE ON-AGAIN, OFF-AGAIN SOVIET AIRLIFT OF FINNISH SOLDIERS FROM HELSINKI TO CAIRO -- SCHEDULED TO CONCLUDE TODAY -- HAS REPORTEDLY BROKEN DOWN AGAIN, DELAYING UNTIL NOVEMBER 10 AT THE EARLIEST THE ARRIVAL IN

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FORM DS 322A(OCR)

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EGYPT OF THE FINAL ELEMENTS OF FINLAND'S 589-MAN UNEF CONTINGENT. IN OTHER UNEF DEVELOPMENTS, NEPAL ANNOUNCED FORMALLY TODAY ITS DECISION TO COMMIT NEPALESE TROOPS TO THE UNEF, AND THERE WERE UNCONFIRMED REPORTS IN DAKAR THAT SENEGAL HAD ALSO OFFERED TROOPS TO THE UNSYG FOR SERVICE IN THE UNEF (THE ONLY AFRICANS THUS FAR INCLUDED IN THE FORCE ARE THE GHANAIS WHOSE REPRESENTATIVES ARE DISCUSSING FINAL ARRANGEMENTS WITH UN OFFICIALS IN NEW YORK TODAY). NEPALESE OFFICIALS WILL MEET WITH THEIR UN COUNTERPARTS IN NEW YORK ON NOVEMBER 10 TO DISCUSS DETAILS OF THE NEPALESE DEPLOYMENT.

4. RED CROSS AND POWS. ICRC REPRESENTATIVE IN GENEVA INFORMED US MISSION THAT ICRC HAS BEEN IN CONSTANT STATE OF ALERT TO CARRY OUT ITS RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER GENEVA CONVENTION FOR POW EXCHANGE. HE EXPECTS EARLY APPROACH TO ICRC FROM EGYPTIANS AND ISRAELIS ON MODALITIES OF POW EXCHANGE. ICRC HAS TWO AIRCRAFT BASED ON CYPRUS AND ANOTHER AIRCRAFT OFFERED BY GERMANY ON STANDBY. ALL CAN BE USED FOR TRANSPORT WOUNDED POWS, CIVILIANS, OR OTHERS IN NEED. ICRC STAFF IN FIELD AND HQ FULLY OPERATIONAL AND READY TO BEGIN OPERATIONS.

5. US/EGYPTIAN RELATIONS: CAIRO NEWSPAPER AL-AHRAM STATED NOVEMBER 9 THAT DR. ASHRAF GHORBAL WILL FLY TO WASHINGTON WITHIN NEXT TWO WEEKS TO HEAD EGYPTIAN INTERESTS SECTION. GHORBAL REPORTEDLY WILL CARRY A LETTER OF CREDENTIALS ISSUED BY EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER TO US SECRETARY OF STATE AND NOT TO PRESIDENT BECAUSE OF ABSENCE OF FULL DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES. PAPER EXPLAINS THAT FLAG OF INDIAN EMBASSY WILL CONTINUE TO FLY OVER EGYPTIAN INTERESTS SECTION IN WASHINGTON AND SPANISH FLAG WILL CONTINUE TO FLY OVER USINT CAIRO.

6. FULBRIGHT STATEMENT: SENATOR FULBRIGHT IN SENATE SPEECH NOVEMBER 9 CALLED ON UNITED STATES AND SOVIET UNION TO PERSUADE AND PRESSURE ISRAEL TO GIVE UP ARAB TERRITORY CONQUERED SINCE 1967 IN EXCHANGE FOR SUPERPOWER GUARANTEE OF HER SECURITY. FULBRIGHT SAID PRECISE TERMS OF PEACE SETTLEMENT FOR MIDDLE EAST WOULD HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT IN PROTRACTED NEGOTIATIONS. "BUT THE GENERAL REQUIREMENTS ARE CLEAR: THE RECOVERY OF LOST LANDS BY THE ARABS AND SECURITY FOR ISRAEL. IT IS UP TO US, AND UP TO THE RUSSIANS, WORKING THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS, TO APPLY WHATEVER DEGREE OF PERSUASION WE CAN, OR WHATEVER DEGREE OF PRESSURE WE MUST, TO BRING ABOUT A COMPROMISE PEACE BASED UPON THE PRINCIPLES OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF NOVEMBER, 1967.

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IT WOULD THEN BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SOVIET UNION
AND THE UNITED STATES, THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS, TO
GUARANTEE THE SETTLEMENT. END QUOTE.

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EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: MASS EG UR

SUBJECT: REPORT OF SOVIET EQUIPMENT AND MILITARY
PERSONNEL IN EGYPT X

1. USINT SOURCE REPORTS THAT ON NOVEMBER 8 MINISTRY OF INTERIOR WAS INFORMED BY MILITARY COMMAND THAT SPECIAL SECURITY MEASURES WERE TO BE TAKEN FOR THE CAIRO WEST AREA. ACCORDING TO MININT OFFICIAL WITH WHOM SOURCE MAINTAINS CLOSE RELATIONSHIP, TWO THOUSAND SOVIET MILITARY PERSONNEL HAD ARRIVED AT CAIRO WEST ALONG WITH SOME 250 TANKS. TANKS WERE OF "LATEST TYPE" AND NEEDED SOVIETS TO RUN AND MAINTAIN THEM. ACCORDING TO MININT SUBSOURCE, ONE-HALF OF SOVIET FORCE CONSISTS OF TANK CREWS; THE REMAINDER ARE MAINTENANCE TECHNICIANS AND ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT PERSONNEL.

2. SUBSOURCE WAS ALSO ABLE TO COMMENT ON INTRODUCTION OF SOVIET-MANNED SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES INTO EGYPT. HE STATED THAT ON OR ABOUT OCTOBER 16/17, 39 SSM'S ARRIVED IN EGYPT, ALONG WITH ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT AND SOVIET CREWS. THEY ARE STATIONED IN DELTA NEAR MANSURA AND IN SHARKIYYA PROVINCE. SUBSOURCE DID NOT IDENTIFY TYPE OF MISSILE, BUT STATED THAT ITS RANGE WAS 360 KM. HE ADDED THAT PURPOSE OF MISSILES WAS RETALIATORY; SHOULD HOSTILITIES RECUR AND ISRAELIS HIT EGYPTIAN POPULATION CENTERS, SSM'S WOULD BE USED AGAINST CIVILIAN ISRAELI TARGETS.

3. SRF INFORMED.
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Operations Center

MIDDLE EAST TASK FORCE
Situation Report #97

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Situation Report in the Middle East as of 0630 EST, 11/6/73

S/S (3)
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Attached is Middle East Task Force Situation Report
Number 97, which was cabled to the Secretary's party.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
APPROVED <i>Reginald M. L...</i>
DEPUTY SECRETARY FOR OPERATIONS

SECRET/EXDIS

GDS - DECLASS Dec. 31, 1981

FORM DS 322(OCR)

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NEA TASK FORCE:EPDJEREJIAN:PD
11/6/73 EXT:29380
NEA TASK FORCE:EPDJEREJIAN

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IMMEDIATE ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS, EXEMPT KAMPALA,
NOUAKCHOTT IMMEDIATE

EXDIS TOSEC

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, XF
SUBJ: MIDDLE EAST SITUATION NO. 97

EPD 47

EPD 40
RE 12

TUNIS FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY
INFORM CONSULS
VIENNA PASS USDEL MBFR
KUWAIT POUCH MUSCAT AND DOHA
BEIRUT PASS BAGHDAD

1. MILITARY SITUATION: THERE ARE NO REPORTS OF ANY
SIGNIFICANT CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS. THERE WAS LIMITED AIR
ACTIVITY ON THE PART OF THE ISRAELI AIR FORCE OVER BOTH
THE EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN LINES AND SOME EGYPTIAN AIR FORCE
ACTIVITY ON THE SUEZ FRONT.

2. UNEF: DEPARTMENT IS SEEKING A LIMITED WAIVER ON RE-
QUIREMENT FOR REIMBURSEMENT FOR U.S. AIRLIFT OF UNEF.
WAIVER WOULD BE LIMITED TO INITIAL IMMEDIATE EMERGENCY
AIRLIFT OF UN PERSONNEL AND SUPPLIES TO ME.

PANAMANIAN'S HAVE INFORMED US THAT UN HAS ACCEPTED
PANAMA'S OFFER OF CONTRIBUTION TO UNEF AND THAT PANAMA
WAS PUTTING TOGETHER A 392-MAN FORCE WHICH IS EXPECTED TO
DEPART ON OR ABOUT NOV. 10. OUR EMBASSY IS ATTEMPTING TO
DETERMINE WHETHER REQUEST FOR U.S. AIRLIFT WILL BE MADE.

A POLISH GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN STATED THAT THE MINISTRY

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FORM DS 322A(OCR)

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OF DEFENSE HAS BEGUN FORMATION OF A POLISH UNIT FOR UNEF AND THAT A GROUP OF POLISH EXPERTS WILL LEAVE POLAND NOV. 6 FOR EGYPT TO HOLD TALKS WITH GENERAL SILVASUO, INTERIM UNEF COMMANDER.

3. US/USSR OBSERVERS FOR UNTSO: AFTER EXTENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS, WE AND SOVIETS ARE REACHING AGREEMENT ON RESPECTIVE PERSONNEL LEVELS TO PARTICIPATE IN UNTSO. ACCORDINGLY, AMBASSADOR SCALI PERSONALLY NOTIFIED UNSYG NOVEMBER 5 THAT IF LATTER EXTENDS INVITATION TO U.S. AND SOVIET GOVERNMENTS, EACH GOVERNMENT WOULD BE WILLING TO CONTRIBUTE 36 PERSONNEL TO UNTSO. SCALI EMPHASIZED THAT THERE SHOULD BE FULL INTEGRATION OF AMERICAN AND SOVIET OBSERVERS IN UNTSO WITH NO SPECIAL PRIVILEGES, AND THAT NEITHER GOVERNMENT IS TO HAVE MORE PERSONNEL THAN THAT OF ANY GOVERNMENT REPRESENTED IN UNTSO-- (I.E., SWEDEN WHICH NOW HAS 36). SCALI POINTED OUT SPECIFICALLY TO SOVIET REP MALIK THAT FIGURE OF 36 IS ALL-INCLUSIVE TOTAL APPLYING TO MILITARY MEN, INTERPRETERS AND/OR ANY OTHER SPECIALISTS. SYG WILL BEGIN DRAFTING LETTER ACCEPTING THIS OFFER.

OFFICIAL EGYPTIAN SPOKESMAN AHMED ANIS SAID THAT FIFTY SOVIET OBSERVERS, INCLUDING TWENTY TRANSLATORS, HAVE ARRIVED IN EGYPT BUT THAT THESE OBSERVERS HAVE NOT BEEN EMPLOYED BECAUSE NO INSTRUCTIONS HAVE BEEN RECEIVED FROM UNSYG CONCERNING THEIR PARTICIPATION IN UNTSO. IN ANSWERING QUESTION BY WASHINGTON POST CORRESPONDENT JIM HOAGLAND, ANIS STATED THAT EGYPT NOT RPT NOT OPPOSED TO ACCEPTANCE OF U.S. OBSERVERS.

4. EGYPTIAN POSITION ON POWS AND CEASEFIRE: EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER FAHMY INFORMED SYG WALDHEIM NOVEMBER 5 THAT EGYPT WILL MAKE NO CONCESSIONS ON POWS UNTIL ISRAEL RETURNS TO OCTOBER 22 LINES. WALDHEIM REPORTED THAT FAHMY WAS "VERY FIRM" AND ADDED IT WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR WORLD PUBLIC OPINION, INCLUDING UN, TO PUT PRESSURE ON WASHINGTON TO FORCE ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW. SYG SAID FAHMY CREDITED SECRETARY KISSINGER WITH SINCERE EFFORTS TO OBTAIN CONCESSIONS FROM ISRAEL, BUT REPORTED KISSINGER NOT SUCCEEDING IN BUDGING ISRAELIS. CONSEQUENTLY, FAHMY SAID, THERE IS NO BREAKTHROUGH IN RESOLVING CEASEFIRE IMPASSE. FAHMY REPORTEDLY TOLD AUSTRIAN AMBASSADOR THAT POW ISSUE SHOULD NOT BE TIED TO BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATION PROCESS AND COMPLAINED THAT ISRAELIS WERE MAKING POW RELEASE A CONDITION TO LIFTING OF BLOCKADE OF EGYPTIAN THIRD ARMY.

EGYPTIAN MILITARY SPOKESMAN, MAJOR GENERAL MUKHTAR,

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IN PRESS CONFERENCE NOVEMBER 5, REITERATED THAT EGYPT'S VIEW IS THAT IT IS EASY TO DEFINE THE CEASEFIRE LINES OF OCTOBER 22 BECAUSE EACH SIDE KNOWS THE POSITION IT OCCUPIED ON OCTOBER 22 AND, IN THIS RESPECT, REFERRED TO ISRAELI STATEMENT MADE ON OCTOBER 22 AND ARMED FORCES GENERAL COMMAND STATEMENT ISSUED ON OCTOBER 24. MUKHTAR ALSO REFERRED TO SECRETARY KISSINGER'S PRESS CONFERENCE ON OCTOBER 26 TO THE EFFECT THAT THERE WAS A COLLAPSE IN THE CEASEFIRE RESOLUTION ON THE FIRST DAY OF ITS APPLICATION AND THAT THIS LED TO SOME TERRITORIAL GAINS FOR ISRAEL. EGYPT, ACCORDING TO MUKHTAR, NOTIFIED THE UNTSO CHAIRMAN OF THE DEFINED CEASEFIRE POINTS.

CONCERNING POWS MUKHTAR STATED EGYPT BEGAN HANDING OVER POWS FIVE DAYS AGO BUT THAT ISRAELIS HAVE NOT BEGUN TO DO SO. HE ADDED THE ICRC REPRESENTATIVE VISITED ALL ISRAELI PRISONERS IN HOSPITALS IN EGYPT AND THAT THEY ARE RECEIVING CORRECT AND PROPER TREATMENT.

5. SYRIAN ATTITUDE TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS: SYRIAN DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE AT UN HAS VOLUNTEERED TO USUN, ON MORE THAN ONE OCCASION SINCE OCTOBER 23, THAT SYRIA'S ACCEPTANCE OF UNSC RESOLUTION 338 DEFINITELY MEANS SYRIAN GOVERNMENT ACCEPTS UN RESOLUTION 242. SYRIA HAS REITERATED THIS THEME USUALLY IN CONTEXT OF NECESSITY FOR USG TO ENSURE EARLY ISRAELI COMPLIANCE WITH THESE RESOLUTIONS SINCE ALL ARAB STATES IMMEDIATELY CONCERNED HAVE ACCEPTED THEM.

6. ISRAELI POLITICAL SITUATION: THERE HAVE BEEN NO PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY ISRAELI OFFICIALS AFTER THE ISRAELI CABINET MEETING DURING THE NIGHT OF NOVEMBER 5. TERSE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AFTER THE MEETING, WHICH WAS ALSO ATTENDED BY ISRAELI CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL ELAZAR, MERELY SAID THAT P.M. MEIR HAD REPORTED ON HER WASHINGTON TALKS. ISRAELI OFFICIALS WERE ALSO SILENT ABOUT TALKS FOREIGN MINISTER EBAN IS NOW HOLDING IN ROMANIA, AMONG SPECULATION THAT HE MAY HAVE BEEN INVITED TO BUCHAREST FOR CONTACTS WITH A SOVIET OR ARAB EMISSARY. CLEARER INDICATION OF ISRAELI GOVERNMENT THINKING IS EXPECTED ON NOVEMBER 7 WHEN MRS. MEIR IS SCHEDULED TO ADDRESS THE KNESET. IN MEANTIME, ISRAELI MINISTER OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATION, SHI'MON PERES, SAID ON NOV. 5 THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS CONSIDERING BANNING USE OF PRIVATE CARS ON ONE DAY DURING THE WEEK AND REDUCING ROAD SPEEDS. WAYS ARE ALSO BEING SOUGHT TO SAVE ON ELECTRICITY AND HEATING.

7. SUPPLEMENTAL AID BILL FOR ISRAEL: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE RUSH AND DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CLEMENTS

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FORM DS 322A(OCR)

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TESTIFIED NOV. 6 ON BEHALF OF ADMINISTRATION REQUEST FOR \$2.4 BILLION FOR SUPPLEMENTAL AID TO ISRAEL AND CAMBODIA. PRESS REPORTS STATED THAT BOTH MEN ACKNOWLEDGED THAT TOTAL COST OF RESUPPLY OPERATIONS TO ISRAEL WOULD BE MUCH HIGHER THAN WHAT IS CURRENTLY BEING ASKED. CLEMENTS SAID SOVIETS HAD SUPPLIED AT LEAST 100,000 TONS OF AMMUNITION AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO THE ARABS SINCE OCT. 6 AND THAT THE SOVIETS HAD ALREADY SUPPLIED \$1.5 TO \$2 BILLION IN ARMAMENTS TO THE ARABS BEFORE WAR ERUPTED. PRESS REPORTS RUSH AND CLEMENTS STATING THAT ISRAEL HAS ASKED FOR ABOUT \$3 BILLION IN EQUIPMENT, BUT THAT THEY THOUGHT THE \$2.2 BILLION FIGURE WOULD COVER THEIR ACTUAL NEEDS.

8. LIBERIAN SHIPPING BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL: ACCORDING TO UNCONFIRMED PRESS REPORT, PRESIDENT TOLBERT OF LIBERIA SENT CABLE TO ARAB LEAGUE ON NOV. 5 WHICH STATED HE HAS ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS PREVENTING SHIPMENT OF GOODS TO ISRAEL ABOARD LIBERIAN SHIPS.

9. SHAH ON OIL AND JERUSALEM. IN A PRESS INTERVIEW TO THE SAUDI NEWS AGENCY NOV. 5, SHAH REPORTEDLY STATED THAT IRAN WOULD NEITHER INCREASE NOR DECREASE ITS OIL PRODUCTION IN THE WAKE OF REDUCTIONS IN ARAB OIL PRODUCTION AND THAT IRAN WOULD CARRY OUT ITS "PREVIOUSLY FORMULATED PLAN". ON JERUSALEM, SHAH STATED IRAN DOES NOT APPROVE OF ISRAELI SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE HOLY PLACES AND THAT THIS WAS ATTITUDE OF WHOLE ISLAMIC WORLD. 'YY'

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APPROVED BY THE ACTING SECRETARY
S/S - MR. MILLER
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION
S, D, P, PM, NEA, EA

Z 052217Z NOV 73 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY RABAT FLASH

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 217944

STADIS////////////////////////////////////
EXDIS - TOSEC 39

E.O. 11652
TAGS: PGOV
SUBJECT: TESTIMONY BEFORE INOUYE SUBCOMMITTEE
FOR THE SECRETARY

1. I HAVE JUST COMPLETED TESTIFYING BEFORE THE INOUYE
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE ON OUR
REQUEST FOR EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE FOR ISRAEL AND CAMBODIA.
IN MY OPINION THE TESTIMONY WENT WELL.

2. TWO ITEMS WERE MENTIONED ABOUT WHICH YOU SHOULD KNOW
IMMEDIATELY. BOTH CAME IN ANSWERS BY DEPUTY SECRETARY
CLEMENTS TO QUESTIONS ASKED BY COMMITTEE MEMBERS. FIRST,
IN ANSWER TO WHETHER THE RUSSIANS HAD ADVANCED KNOWLEDGE
OF THE INVASION, HE INDICATED THAT HE WOULD LET THE FACT
THAT THE RUSSIAN SEALIFT ARRIVED ALMOST SIMULTANEOUSLY
WITH THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES SPEAK FOR ITSELF. SECONDLY,
IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION ABOUT WHETHER NORTH KOREANS WERE
MANNING PLANES AND SOVIETS WERE OPERATING SAM SITES,
CLEMENTS ANSWERED YES, BUT THAT WE HAD NO INDICATION THAT

ANDERSON
HOLBRIDGE
HOBBS
JORDEN
KENNEDY
LEVIN
LIVINE
MONTGOMERY
O'DON
RATLIN
RONDON
SCHNEIDER
V. I. G.
WALSH

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NATIONALS OF THESE COUNTRIES WERE ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN HOSTILITIES. HE ALSO MENTIONED THAT THERE WERE PAKISTANIS IN THE AREA INVOLVED IN PURELY TRAINING ACTIVITIES.

3. I AM SURE THAT THE PRESS SUMMARIES WILL TREAT THESE
HEARINGS FURTHER. RUSH

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

1120Q
05 NOV 73 Z16 27

0 051225Z NOV 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4370
BT
SECRET TEHRAN 7752

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MARR, IR
SUBJECT: USS HANCOCK TASK FORCE

REF: A. TEHRAN 7720; B. CINCPACFLT 042202Z NOV 73

1. CINCPACFLT SECRET REFTEL WITH THIRTY ADDRESSEES STATES APPROVAL FOR USE OF BANDAR ABBAS FOR P-3 OPERATIONS "MAY BE IMMINENT." TEHRAN 7720 STRESSED THAT SHAH IMPOSED ONE FIRM CONDITION ON P-3 USE OF BANDAR ABBAS, I.E. THAT WE STRICTLY ADHERE TO COVER STORY THAT AIRCRAFT WERE IN IRAN TO ASSIST IN TRAINING IRANIANS WITH P-3'S, IN PREPARATION FOR THEIR LATER ACQUISITION OF THAT TYPE OF AIRCRAFT. NEITHER CINCPACFLT REFTEL NOR CONTINGENCY PLAN CONTAINED CTF SEVEN TWO 281106Z OCT, BOTH OF WHICH ANTEDATE OUR TELEGRAM, MAKES ANY MENTION OF NEED FOR COVER STORY.

2. PLEASE ASSURE THAT ALL COMMANDS INVOLVED IN THIS EXERCISE ARE MADE AWARE OF STIPULATED COVER STORY AND ARE DULY IMPRESSED WITH REQUIREMENT THAT WE ADHERE TO IT.

3. SHOULD YOU LEARN STORY IS ABOUT TO BREAK PUBLICLY, WE REQUEST MAXIMUM ADVANCE NOTICE AT WHATEVER TIME OF DAY OR NIGHT SO THAT WE MAY FOREWARN GOI.

HELMS

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TOP SECRET

WAR



THE JOINT STAFF

N M C C

THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

BO

4 November 1973
0700 EST

MEMORANDUM FOR THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Subject: Recapitulation of Airlift Deliveries to
Israel

Listed below are data covering US airlift deliveries
to Israel as of 0830Z 4 November 1973:

Total for 24- Hour Periods Ending 0830Z on the Day Shown*	29 Oct	30 Oct	31 Oct	1 Nov
By Soviets	320-432	180-252	100-120**	40-48
By U.S. Mil	792	640	739	739
By El Al	309	85	52	258
	2 Nov	3 Nov	4 Nov	
By Soviets	10-12	30-36	50-60	
By U.S. Mil	579	819	696	
By El Al	148	197	183	
Cumulative Totals*	29 Oct	30 Oct	31 Oct	1 Nov
By Soviets	11510-14808	11690-15060	11790-15810**	11830-15228
By U.S. Mil	12084	12724	13463	14202
By U.S./El Al	3166	3251	3303	3561
	2 Nov	3 Nov	4 Nov	
By Soviets	11840-15240	11870-15276	11920-15336	
By U.S. Mil	14781	15600	16296	
By U.S./El Al	3709	3906	4089	

* Excluding aircraft delivered.

** Adjusted figure.

TOP SECRET

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U.S. Aircraft Delivered

<u>No.</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Date Delivered</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
8	F-4E	14 Oct 73	
6	F-4E	15 Oct 73	
12	C-130B	15 Oct 73	
12	F-4E	17 Oct 73	
2	F-4E	18 Oct 73	
4	F-4E	20 Oct 73	
8	A-4	21 Oct 73	
10	A-4	22 Oct 73	
7	F-4	22 Oct 73	
1	F-4	23 Oct 73	F-4 air delivery completed.
13	A-4	23 Oct 73	
5	A-4	24 Oct 73	
2	A-4	28 Oct 73	A-4 air delivery completed.
4	A-4	2 Nov 73	8 A-4s in transit by ship. 4 A-4s awaiting sealift in Norfolk.

Sorties

	<u>Last 24 Hours</u>	<u>Cumulative</u>
C-141	12	311
C-5	5	106
E1 A1	6	104

DISTRIBUTION:

CJCS
DJS
M11 Asst to SecDef
J-30
J-31
J-32
J-33
J-36
J-37
J-4
DDO, NMCC
ADDO, NMCC

J. T. Coughlin
J. T. COUGHLIN
Rear Admiral, USN
Deputy Director for
Operations, NMCC

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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~~SAUNDERS~~ *Uran*
for
for
for
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Operations Center

MIDDLE EAST TASK FORCE
Situation Report #89

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Situation Report in the Middle East as of 0600 EST, 11/3/73

S/S (3)

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Cease-fire - The cease-fire continues to hold although one UNTSO observer gives it no more than a 50-50 chance because he feels the Egyptians are using the cease-fire to re-equip their forces on the northern East Bank sector. Meanwhile, our Embassy in Amman reports having been told by the Jordanian P.M. that the latest Jordanian intelligence from Cairo points to the possibility of renewed fighting in the very near future. The Jordanians say the Egyptians were angered by Mrs. Meir's November 2 statements. In an address to American Jewish leaders, Mrs. Meir denied that the American Government is putting pressure on Israel, and said Israel has four demands: the exchange of prisoners; the lifting of the blockade in the Red Sea; the maintenance of the cease-fire; and peace talks.

Diplomatic Activity - While intensive diplomatic activity continued in Washington, Egyptian President Sadat on November 1 and 2 visited Kuwait and Saudi Arabia for meetings with Syrian President Al-Asad, Kuwait's ruler As-Sabah, and Saudi King Feisal. We have no solid information on the purpose or results of Sadat's travel, but Egypt's news agency MENA called it an "extremely important working visit" designed to assess the current situation in light of Foreign Minister Fahmi's visit to Washington and Secretary of State Kissinger's forthcoming visit to several Arab capitals. On his return to Cairo, Sadat met with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov, who is reportedly preparing to return to Moscow via Damascus.

Sadat also met with Algerian President Boumedienne in Cairo and talks with the Algerian leader are reportedly continuing today. Meanwhile, Embassy Tel Aviv reports that Israeli Foreign Minister Eban has accepted an urgent invitation from the Romanian Government to visit Bucharest to participate in high-level consultations with representatives of Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Sudan, Morocco and Algeria.

SECRET/EXDIS
GDS - DECLASS Dec. 31, 1981

SECRET/EXDIS

2.

Shell Cuts Japan's Oil Again - Shell International notified Japanese oil companies of an additional 17 percent reduction in oil supplies effective 1 November according to a Tokyo broadcast monitored by FBIS. Earlier Shell cut its supply to Japan by 10 percent effective 1 October.

UNEF/UNTSO - Late last night, Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmi informed the Department, while the Egyptian UN Mission informed the Secretary General, that Egypt agreed to allow US military aircraft to overfly and land in Egypt in connection with the UNEF operation. In order to assure the safety of our aircraft and personnel, we have instructed our Interests Section in Cairo to seek urgent confirmation of this from the Foreign Ministry. In the meantime, the two USAF C-141s carrying 79 Finnish troops and 20 tons of supplies have arrived at Rhein Main pending confirmation of clearance from Cairo; they will then fly directly to Cairo for unloading and return, via Incirlik. Likewise, the two C-130s with equipment from the UN depot in Pisa, Italy, have been loaded and are standing by to take off for Cairo when word is received confirming overflight and landing permission. HMG has been told that we do not anticipate using the standby alternative of unloading in Cyprus and transshipping via the RAF.

The UN Security Council, late last night, approved the dispatch of seven national contingents to the UNEF in the Middle East: Ghana, Indonesia, Nepal, Panama and Peru, with Poland and Canada providing logistics units. The Soviets have protested the (900-man) size of the Canadian contingent to SYG Waldheim, but the Canadians are unwilling to break up their unit, especially designed for such service. We have asked USUN to assess the likely reaction to a possible battalion-sized Brazilian contribution to the UNEF.


Meanwhile, at the UN, Assistant SYG Urquhart told Ambassador Schaufele that the proportion of the Soviet contribution to the UNEF airlift was causing the UN increasing difficulty in trying to maintain a semblance of balance, given Egyptian restrictions on the use of USAF aircraft. He also said the UN was getting "exactly nowhere" on logistics problems; Egypt is unhappy over the size of the Canadian contingent and the Canadians will not split it. On the other hand, the Poles do not have a clue about what logistics requirements they will have to perform, and may have to send officers to New York to coordinate with the UN and the Canadians before they can get a unit organized, equipped and dispatched. In the meantime, the UNEF has no logistics staff, no logistics unit, no medical unit, supplies are arriving in Cairo and disorganization on the ground is almost complete. Siilasvuo cannot receive any more units until the logistics situation is resolved.

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3.

ADDENDUM - USINT Cairo has confirmed receipt of our request that they check overflight and landing clearances, but has not been able to reach an Egyptian authority who can confirm that these have been granted. After consultation with the UN Secretariat and the USAF Military Airlift Command, and determining that there is insufficient time remaining for our aircraft to reach Cairo during daylight hours, the USAF has been advised to stand-down for today. (0610 EST)



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WAR

2 November 1973

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Whither the Middle East Cease-fire.

The Middle East cease-fire has stabilized to a degree, but it is still fragile and under certain circumstances could well breakdown. While we cannot predict with great confidence what will happen in even the near term, this paper does identify the most critical factors in this situation.

Israel's Situation

There are pressures both for and against Israel breaking the cease-fire. Tempers and tensions are running so high that there is a serious risk of a breakdown; much depends on what actions are taken by the Arabs or by the US and the Soviet Union.

The most direct constraint on Israel is its dependence on the US for diplomatic and financial support and for military re-supply. Israelis believe they accepted the cease-fire in response to US pressure and believe the cease-fire was imposed when the fighting was turning clearly in Israel's favor. Israel says it agreed to the relief convoy for the Egyptian 3rd Army only after strong pressure from the US. Israel is clearly more sensitive to US pressure at this stage because Tel Aviv is virtually isolated diplomatically.

The Israelis not only worry about the possibility of direct Soviet intervention, but they also recognize that, short of intervention the Soviets will provide the Arabs with weapons that can be used effectively against Israeli forces, or at least will produce heavier casualties than were suffered before the cease-fire. Israel, with only three million people, is extraordinarily casualty-sensitive. The high casualty rate so far is already bringing strong domestic pressure on Tel Aviv. Moreover, although the Israelis have attributed most of the Arab success in this war to Soviet weapons, they grudgingly admit that the Arabs fought better than in the Six-Day War.

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Israel also recognizes that the Arabs showed greater capacity for united action in this war than previously. If Israel unilaterally broke the cease-fire it seems certain that most of the Arabs would return to the front again, and the Israelis from their experience of the past several weeks must question whether they can long sustain a two or three front war.

Finally, there is the problem of the Scud missile, possibly equipped with a nuclear warhead. It can reach a number of Israel's population centers, including Tel Aviv and Israel's own nuclear facility at Dimona. The Israelis have no defense against a SCUD attack; only their own retaliatory deterrent.

These factors weigh against Israel breaking the cease-fire. There are, however, some circumstances in which Israel would go back to fighting.

If the Israelis, who look to Washington to deter the Soviets become convinced that the US is not successfully influencing the Soviets to keep their clients from nibbling away at the cease-fire, the Israelis might be tempted to take the opportunity to pursue the destruction of the Egyptian and Syrian armies as fighting forces. In another case, Israel might decide that the Egyptians, supported by the Soviets, were preparing a new major attack. The Tel Aviv government, already under fire for misreading Arab intentions and not making preemptive strikes against Syria and Egypt before October 6, is probably now more alert--perhaps even over alert--to a renewal of the war by the Arabs than before. This time Israel would not err on the side of caution. Again, Israel clearly also feels that it was halted in a march to victory by the cease-fire. Military commanders, and perhaps the government as well, are anxious to "finish the job" and remove the tarnish from the image of Israeli military superiority.

The POW issue is a second source of pressure on the Israeli leaders. Israel attached the release of Israeli war prisoners as a condition of its acceptance of the cease-fire. The prompt return of POWs from Egypt and Syria has become a heated domestic issue, and makes the Israelis both more willing to act toughly and more obdurate in resisting pressure to allow humanitarian supply of the Egyptian 3rd Army or any return to the October 22 cease-fire lines. Any Egyptian attempt to relieve the Israeli encirclement would clearly invite Israeli military action.

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A third opening for new fighting is the Egyptian naval activity--a kind of "blockade"--at the Straits of Bab-al-Mandab at the entrance to the Red Sea. Israel is dependent upon Iranian shipments of oil, which usually come through the Red Sea to the Israeli port of Elat. Israel is believed to have four months supply of oil and has not attempted to run the "blockade," but Tel Aviv has said this is a violation of the cease-fire and would attempt to end it if necessary.

There is, finally, a chance that if Israel loses confidence now in US long-term support and objectives, the Israelis might seize the present, relatively favorable although dangerous moment, to cast aside the cease-fire and try to reduce further the Arab military potential. They would argue they had little to lose, if the US were turning away from them.

Egypt's Situation

Clear pressures exist in Egypt for breaking the cease-fire, at least to push Israeli forces back to the cease-fire lines of 22 October, if not to drive them completely from the Suez Canal west bank. The factors which would normally act against a renewal of fighting could in other cases, constitute the reasons for new hostilities.

For the very near term, Secretary Kissinger's impending visit to Cairo and the plans the Egyptians hope he will bring with him for stabilizing the 22 October lines by diplomatic means should forestall Egyptian-initiated hostilities. Pressures on President Sadat to act now militarily are already heavy, however, and they will mount if he does not receive what he feels is satisfaction--and what he can portray as such to the Egyptian military--from the visit.

Sadat's own view is probably somewhat ambivalent. Although he might see hope that the US is ready to press Israel, even if Secretary Kissinger does not bring him full satisfaction on the immediate question of the cease-fire lines, this very hope might induce him to give the US an extra push by initiating further hostilities.

From the Egyptian standpoint, this has throughout been as much a psychological as a military war, and the present situation has psychological disadvantages which many Egyptians probably feel require redressing. The feeling of restored

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honor which Egypt gained in the initial stages of the fighting has been diminished by the Israeli penetration of the west bank and still further by the encirclement of the Third Army; the brief taste of the ultimate success could demand an attempt at a bigger bite. More than this, the loss of the Third Army would mean the loss of one of the strategic bridgeheads east of Suez that are critical to Egypt's bargaining position.

Sadat himself may well be willing to allow diplomacy a relatively long lead time to bring movement toward easing the present situation and ultimately toward an acceptable settlement. His military leadership is somewhat more impatient, however, and his position may not remain strong enough to withstand its pressures. The prospect of the Third Army's collapse would place him still more vulnerable to narrow military arguments.

The Egyptian perception of the extent to which Moscow is willing to provide backing can in large measure determine future Egyptian moves. If Soviet moves toward confrontation are a bluff and if Cairo knows it, the chances of a deliberate renewal of the fighting would be somewhat diminished. The SCUD alone is not enough with which to win a war; its indiscriminate and unprovoked use would ruin the image of some moderation which the Egyptians have been at pains to put forward; and its use in the absence of a firm commitment of full Soviet military backing would virtually assure ferocious retaliation from Israel.

If the Egyptians have, or believe they can extract, a solid commitment from the USSR, the situation could be changed markedly. Constraints on and inducements for further military action might equally apply. On the one hand, Cairo might be hesitant to undertake action which could irrevocably commit it again to full and long-term future dependence on Moscow; Sadat and much of the Egyptian military are probably as chary now as they have ever been of Soviet designs on Egypt. On the other hand, Sadat desperately wants the Israelis out of Egypt and out of the Sinai completely, and he may be willing to go some distance in accommodating the Soviets if he thinks they can help him achieve these ends.

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Beyond these broader intangibles, other factors could, inadvertently or otherwise, provoke a new round of fighting. Individual action by the Third Army to break out of its entrapment, overzealous reaction to routine air reconnaissance or ground patrolling, or an Israeli attempt to run the semi-blockade at the Bab-al-Mandab could bring more general hostilities in the present volatile atmosphere.

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BT

SECRET STATE 217489

NODIS

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MEETING ON MIDDLE EAST WITH NATO
AMBASSADORS

KUWAIT PASS DOHA, MANAMA, MUSCAT

BEIRUT POUCH BAGHDAD

1. AT A MEETING ON NOVEMBER 2 WITH THE AMBASSADORS OF ALL
NATO COUNTRIES, SECRETARY MISSINGAR REVIEWED MIDDLE EASTERN
EVENTS OF RECENT WEEKS, EXPLAINED THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE
ALERT OF US FORCES AND COMMENTED UPON THE PROSPECTS FOR
NEGOTIATIONS.

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2. THE SECRETARY OBSERVED THAT, HOWEVER THE CAUSES OF THE MIDDLE EASTERN HOSTILITIES MIGHT BE VIEWED, THE WAR HAD RAISED A NUMBER OF ISSUES: (1) THE DANGERS INHERENT IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE, (2) THE QUESTION OF THE SOVIET UNION'S ROLE IN STARTING, EXACERBATING OR ATTEMPTING TO END THE WAR, (3) THE LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIP OF THE US AND OTHER WEST TO ISRAEL AND THE ARABS AND (4) THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE US, ON THE ONE HAND, AND WESTERN EUROPE AND JAPAN ON THE OTHER. IN BALANCING THESE CONSIDERATIONS, THE US HAD THREE OBJECTIVES: TO END HOSTILITIES SOONEST; TO BRING ABOUT A CEASEFIRE UNDER CONDITIONS GIVING THE US AND WESTERN EUROPE A CENTRAL ROLE TO PLAY IN REACHING A POSTWAR SETTLEMENT; AND TO CIRCUMSCRIBE SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE AREA. IN THE US VIEW THESE AIMS ARE IN THE LONG-TERM INTEREST OF

ALL THE ALLIES; IT COULD NOT BE TO THE ADVANTAGE OF EUROPE OR JAPAN FOR SOVIET INFLUENCE TO INCREASE OR US INFLUENCE TO DIMINISH.

3. DURING THE INITIAL PHASE OF THE WAR, THE SECRETARY NOTED, THE US HAD SOUGHT ABOVE ALL TO ACHIEVE A CEASE-FIRE BUT REFRAINED FROM PROPOSING A RESOLUTION IN THE UN OUT OF FEAR THAT THIS WOULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE. THE US REMAINED IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE SOVIET UNION WHICH, HOWEVER, WAS NOT ANXIOUS TO BRING HOSTILITIES TO AN END AS LONG AS HER ALLIES WERE WINNING. ON WEDNESDAY OF THE FIRST WEEK (OCT. 10) THE SOVIETS BEGAN MOUNTING AN AIRLIFT TO THE AREA, DESPITE OUR REPEATED APPEALS FOR RESTRAINT. AT THIS POINT THE US WAS NOT SENDING ANY APPRECIABLE AMOUNT OF EQUIPMENT TO ISRAEL, AND FEWER THAN SEVEN EL AL AIRCRAFT HAD CARRIED SUPPLIES FROM HERE. ON SATURDAY (OCT. 13) OF THAT WEEK THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION AGREED ON A CEASE-FIRE IN PLACE, PROVIDING IT WERE ACCEPTABLE TO ALL PARTIES.

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Department of State

SECRET

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4. HOWEVER, THE SECRETARY CONTINUED, WHEN THE CEASEFIRE WAS NOT ACCEPTED, THE US SAW NO DIPLOMATIC MEANS TO SETTLE THE CONFLICT AND HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO MATCH THE SOVIET AIRLIFT. THE AIRLIFT, WHICH WAS IN ALL OF OUR INTERESTS, WAS MADE POSSIBLE BECAUSE OF PORTUGAL'S COOPERATION; THIS FACT IS APPRECIATED BY THE PRESIDENT AND WILL NOT BE FORGOTTEN. THE MERITS OF THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT WERE IRRELEVANT TO THIS OPERATION. A VICTORY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, ACHIEVED THROUGH SOVIET ARMS AND UNDER SOVIET DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION, COULD NOT BUT GIVE THE ARABS THE UPPER HAND AND COULD NOT BUT GIVE RADICAL ARAB GOVERNMENTS THE LEADING ROLE IN THE AREA, WITH DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES. THE US IS CONVINCED THAT ITS ACTIONS WERE IN THE INTEREST OF ALL WESTERN COUNTRIES.

5. WITH THE AIRLIFT UNDERWAY, THE SECRETARY SAID, THE US INFORMED THE SOVIETS OF ITS ACTION AND OFFERED TO HALT THIS AIRLIFT WHEN THEY STOPPED THEIRS. THE US ALSO IMPRESSED UPON THE ARABS THAT THEY WOULD NEED US SUPPORT IN WORKING OUT A SETTLEMENT- TWO DAYS LATER (OCT. 15) THE SOVIETS INFORMED US THAT KOSYGIN WOULD VISIT THE MIDDLE EAST TO INITIATE A NEW APPROACH. WITH THE TIDE OF BATTLE TURNING A WEEK LATER, THE US RECEIVED A FEELER FROM THE SOVIETS AND ON FRIDAY (OCT. 19) THE SECRETARY WAS INVITED TO VISIT MOSCOW. THERE IT WAS AGREED TO SEEK A SECURITY

COUNCIL RESOLUTION FOR A CEASEFIRE IN PLACE, TO REAFFIRM RESOLUTION 242 AND TO APPEAL FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS UNDER APPROPRIATE AUSPICES.

6. AT THAT POINT, THE SECRETARY OBSERVED, THE US HAD ACHIEVED ITS CENTRAL OBJECTIVES: TO PREVENT A MILITARY VICTORY FOR SOVIET ARMS AND TO ACHIEVE A SITUATION WHERE THE US COULD PLAY A CENTRAL ROLE IN THE NEGOTIATION OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. HOWEVER, THE MILITARY OUTCOME LEFT OPPOSING ARMIES ON EITHER SIDE OF THE SUEZ CANAL ASTRIDE EACH OTHER'S LINES OF COMMUNICATION.

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WHEN THE CEASEFIRE BROKE DOWN THE US RECEIVED SIX OR SEVEN INCREASINGLY MENACING SOVIET DEMARCHES, LEARNED OF THE ALERTING OF SEVEN OF THE EIGHT SOVIET AIRBORNE DIVISIONS AND OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SOVIET COMMAND POST IN SOUTHERN USSR. IN THE MIDDLE OF THE NIGHT OF OCTOBER 24/25 THE SOVIETS PROPOSED A JOINT US-SOVIET EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, THREATENING UNILATERAL ACTION IF THE US DID NOT JOIN IN. THE US FELT IT NECESSARY TO MAKE CLEAR ITS OPPOSITION TO UNILATERAL ACTION. FOR THE SOVIETS TO HAVE PUT FORCES INTO THE AREA WOULD HAVE MEANT THAT FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE 1945 THE SOVIETS WOULD HAVE INTRODUCED COMBAT FORCES INTO A NON-CONTIGUOUS AREA, WITH INCALCULABLE CONSEQUENCES OF WHICH NATO COUNTRIES WOULD HAVE BEEN THE FIRST VICTIMS. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES THE US HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO ACT. SINCE THE NOTE ARRIVED AT 12:30 P.M., WITH A RESPONSE DEMANDED IN A FEW HOURS AND WITH DAWN ABOUT TO BREAK IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THIS ACTION HAD TO BE RAPID. IN THE EVENT, WE INFORMED NATO OF OUR ALERT AT THE PRECISE MOMENT WE GAVE OUR RESPONSE TO THE SOVIETS. EACH MUST MAKE HIS OWN JUDGEMENT, BUT GIVEN THE MAGNITUDE OF THE SOVIET THREAT, IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO MEASURE THE RESPONSE WITH AN EYE DROPPER SO THAT IT MIGHT EXACTLY MATCH THE SOVIET ACTION.

7. THE SECRETARY SAID THE OUTCOME WAS ABOUT AS EXPECTED. HE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE POSSIBILITY MIGHT NOW EXIST TO ACHIEVE A SETTLEMENT. ONCE ISRAEL RECOVERS, IT WILL RECOGNIZE THE DANGER OF ATTRITION THROUGH WAR. THE ARABS APPEAR TO BEGIN TO REALIZE THAT THEY NEED A MAJOR DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE OF THEIR OWN AND CANNOT CONTINUE TO RELY ON SOVIET ARMS. PROVIDING THE WEST CAN AVOID THE TEMPTATION OF PLAYING FOR SMALL STAKES, A SENSIBLE DIPLOMATIC SETTLEMENT MIGHT BE WORKED OUT.

8. THE SECRETARY ASKED WHERE THIS SITUATION LEAVES DETENTE. NOTING THAT THE US HAD NEVER MAINTAINED THAT THERE HAD BEEN A CHANGE IN THE SOVIET SYSTEM, OR THAT OUR POLICY AIM WAS TO ACHIEVE A CHANGE IN THE SOVIET DOMESTIC POLITICAL SYSTEM, HE POINTED OUT THAT US POLICY HAS BEEN BASED ON THE BELIEF THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO REDUCE THE RISKS OF NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION, AND AVOID A HOLOCAUST. THE US HAD NEVER STRAYED FROM THE VIEW THAT SOVIET AGGRESSION

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WOULD HAVE TO BE RESISTED AND THAT DETENTE MUST NOT BE USED TO WEAKEN ALLIANCES OR EXACERBATE LOCAL DIFFERENCES. AT THE SAME TIME THE US REMAINS OF THE VIEW THAT DETENTE IS STILL IMPORTANT, THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO CONTINUE TO REDUCE THE DANGERS OF NUCLEAR WAR, AND THAT WE WILL PURSUE THIS AIM SO FAR AS SOVIET POLICY PERMITS. A CONDOMINIUM WITH THE SOVIETS HAS NEVER BEEN A US OBJECTIVE AND IS NOT REPEAT NOT NOW.

9. REFERRING TO US DISSATISFACTION WITH THE ALLIES, THE SECRETARY REMARKED THAT IT WOULD BE A GREAT ERROR TO BELIEVE THAT THE US HAD NOT MEANT WHAT IT HAD SAID IN THIS RESPECT. WE MEANT IT AND STILL DO. IT WAS NOT DIRECTED AGAINST ONE GOVERNMENT; RATHER IT WAS THE RESULT OF ACCUMULATION OVER MANY MONTHS, WHERE THE US THOUGHT IT WAS DEFENDING THE VITAL INTERESTS OF ALL, AND DID NOT DISCOVER A COMPREHENDING ATTITUDE ON THE PART OF THE ALLIES. THE SECRETARY STRESSED, HOWEVER, THAT NATO REMAINS THE CORNERSTONE OF US FOREIGN POLICY. FOR NEARLY A YEAR THE US HAD SOUGHT TO REVIVIFY THE ALLIANCE AND IMPROVE CONSULTATIVE ARRANGEMENTS.. THIS INVIGORATION REMAINS ESSENTIAL: THE US OFFER REMAINS OPEN. HOWEVER, THE SECRETARY NOTED, THE CURRENT PROBLEM IS NOT A MATTER OF INADEQUATE CONSULTATION; SOME OF THE DEEPEST DIFFERENCES HAD BEEN WITH COUNTRIES WITH WHICH WE HAD MOST CLOSELY CONSULTED. NONETHELESS THE US IS PREPARED TO IMPROVE THE CONSULTATIVE PROCESS WHERE IT HAS FAILED AND TO GO FORWARD TO PUT NEW LIFE INTO RELATIONSHIPS.

10. IN RESPONSE TO THE SECRETARY'S COMMENTS, THE AMBASSADORS EXPRESSED WARM APPRECIATION FOR THE MEETING AND VOICED A STRONG HOPE FOR SIMILAR SESSIONS IN THE FUTURE. SOME OF THEM EXPRESSED REGRET THAT SUCH A MEETING HAD NOT BEEN HELD EARLIER. RESPONDING TO A QUESTION BY CANADIAN AMBASSADOR CAPIEUX ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR NEGOTIATIONS, THE SECRETARY STATED THAT THOUGH HE HAD HELD DISCUSSIONS WITH ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER FAHMI AND MRS. MEIR, HE COULD NOT REPORT THAT IT IS YET POSSIBLE TO FORM A BROAD, CLEAR PICTURE ABOUT THE OUTLOOK FOR NEGOTIATIONS. THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS ARE TO SOLIDIFY THE CEASEFIRE AND TO START THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. SO FAR THE US HAS CONCENTRATED ON THE FORMER; IT HAS, HOWEVER, NO INTENTION OF FORMULATING NEGOTIATING PROPOSALS OF ITS

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OWN. SINCE A US PLAN WOULD INEVITABLY DRAW FIRE FROM ALL SIDES, THE US HAD RESTRICTED ITSELF TO PROCEDURES RATHER THAN SUBSTANCE. IN FACT NEITHER SIDE HAS SO FAR DEVELOPED MUCH OF A SUBSTANTIVE POSITION.

11. REPLYING TO DUTCH AMBASSADOR VAN LYNDEN'S QUERY REGARDING CONTINGENCY PLANNING IN CONNECTION WITH THE OIL SITUATION, THE SECRETARY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT MAINTENANCE OF OIL SUPPLIES WILL BE A SEVERE PROBLEM IN THE MIDDLE TERM EVEN FOR THE US. HE NOTED THAT THE NETHERLANDS, WHICH HAD SUPPORTED THE US IN THE RECENT CRISIS, IS A PARTICULAR TARGET OF THE ARABS. IN THE US VIEW, THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE ARAB COUNTRIES OBSERVE PANIC IN WESTERN EUROPE AND ANTICIPATE EUROPEAN PRESSURE ON THE US, THEY WILL TO THAT EXTENT BE TEMPTED TO DELAY NEGOTIATING. BUT SHOULD THIS PRESSURE BE WITHSTOOD, THERE IS REASON TO BELIEVE THAT PROGRESS TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BEGIN IN TWO TO THREE WEEKS. WE SHOULD RESTRAIN MEASURES THAT SHOW UNCERTAINTY WHILE WE SEEK TO ACHIEVE A SETTLEMENT.

12. REFERRING TO THE SECRETARY'S REMARKS ABOUT US-EUROPEAN COOPERATION, DANISH AMBASSADOR BARTELS ASKED WHETHER THE US IS SATISFIED WITH THE PROGRESS ACHIEVED IN RESPONSE TO THE SECRETARY'S APRIL 23 SPEECH. THE SECRETARY SAID HE WISHED TO RESPOND IN FULL CANDOR. THE US HAD SOUGHT TO GIVE THE ATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP A NEW CONTENT, TO PROVIDE A NEW EMOTIONAL COMMITMENT TO ALLIANCE RELATIONS. THE GENERATION THAT HAD FORMED NATO IS PASSING FROM PUBLIC LIFE AND IT IS IMPORTANT TO PROVIDE A COUNTERWEIGHT TO DOMESTIC ISOLATIONISTS. THE IMPRESSION MUST NOT ARISE THAT FOREIGN POLICY SUCCESSSES ARE POSSIBLE ONLY WITH ADVERSARIES. IT HAD NEVER BEEN THE US INTENTION TO BLACKMAIL EUROPE INTO MAKING ECONOMIC CONCESSIONS. THERE ARE TWO ESSENTIALS TO THE US PROPOSAL: THE RESULT MUST COME FROM A COOPERATIVE EFFORT, SUPPORTED BY PUBLIC OPINION IN THE US, AND THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PRODUCT MUST BEAR SOME RELATIONSHIP TO THE ORIGINAL OBJECTIVE. WE WANT A CONSENSUS, NOT CONFRONTATION. SO FAR, HOWEVER, THE WORK INCREASINGLY HAS BEEN DELEGATED TO THE EXPERT LEVEL AND MIGHT NEVER RISE ABOVE IT- WHILE THE US REGARDS THE DOCUMENT PRODUCED BY THE EC-NINE AT COPENHAGEN A GREAT

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STEP FORWARD FOR THE EUROPEANS, THE SUBSTANCE OF THE DOCUMENT IS FAR FROM HISTORIC. WHILE IT REFLECTS MOVEMENT TOWARD EUROPEAN UNIFICATION THIS TREND HAS PRODUCED DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES. THE DISPUTE OVER THE WORD "PARTNERSHIP" IS SYMPTOMATIC. MOREOVER, IT IS NOT EASY TO EXPLAIN TO AMERICAN LEADERS WHY WESTERN SECURITY IS INDIVISIBLE

BUT "PARTNERSHIP" CAN NOT BE USED TO CHARACTERIZE THE OVERALL US-EUROPEAN RELATIONSHIP. BY CONTRAST THE NATO DOCUMENT IS PROMISING THOUGH IT IS INEXPLICABLE TO US THAT THERE IS A QUESTION AS TO WHY SUCH A DOCUMENT SHOULD NOT BE SIGNED BY THE PRESIDENT WITH HIS COLLEAGUES. BUT THESE PROBLEMS, THE SECRETARY CONCLUDED, ARE REMEDIABLE AND THE US IS PREPARED TO PROCEED WITH AN OPEN MIND IN REMOVING DIFFICULTIES.

13. AFTER DEFENDING THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION TO ORDER AN ALERT OF US FORCES, BRITISH AMBASSADOR CROMER INQUIRED ABOUT THE MEANING OF "APPROPRIATE AUSPICES" UNDER UN RESOLUTION 338. THE SECRETARY COMMENTED THAT WHEN HE WAS IN MOSCOW, THE SOVIETS HAD INSISTED THAT THE TWO COUNTRIES SHOULD PROVIDE THEIR AUSPICES, IF ACCEPTABLE TO THE UN. THE US AGREED, SUBJECT TO THE CONCURRENCE OF THE PARTIES INVOLVED. IN THE US VIEW THIS WAS THE BEST WAY OF PERSUADING THE OTHERS, ESPECIALLY ISRAEL, TO JOIN THE PROCESS TOWARD NEGOTIATION.

14. RESPONDING TO GERMAN AMBASSADOR VON STADEN ABOUT MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT THE CONFLICT HAD AT FIRST APPEARED LIMITED AND THE US REFRAINED FROM PROVIDING MILITARY ASSISTANCE. ONLY WHEN THE SOVIET UNION CALLED FOR WIDER ARAB INTERVENTION AND PROVIDED MILITARY EQUIPMENT DID THE CONFLICT EXPAND.

15. FRENCH AMBASSADOR KOSCIUSKO-MORIZET REMARKED THAT THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT MUST NOT BE TRANSFORMED INTO AN EAST-WEST CONFLICT AND THAT A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS THE BEST WAY TO AVOID A CONFLICT THERE. THE SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT THERE IS SOME AGREEMENT AMONG THE PARTICIPANTS ON MOVING TOWARD A NEGOTIATING PROCESS. DIPLOMATIC PROCEDURES MIGHT START AS EARLY AS THE LAST WEEK OF NOVEMBER OR BY MID-DECEMBER.

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16. IN RESPONSE TO PORTUGUESE AMBASSADOR THEMIDO REGARDING SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITIES, THE SECRETARY SAID THAT SOVIET WEAPONS HAD BEEN VERY EFFECTIVE AND THAT THE ARABS HAD USED THEM BETTER THAN BEFORE. YET THE EGYPTIAN ARMY WOULD HAVE BEEN OVERWHELMED HAD A CEASEFIRE NOT BEEN AGREED. SINCE WE WERE STILL NOT THE OBJECT OF FULL ARAB FURY AND SINCE WE STILL HAD TIES WITH ARAB STATES, WE SOUGHT TO PREVENT THEIR TOTAL MILITARY HUMILIATION BY PRESSING FOR THE CEASEFIRE.

17. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE MEETING, IT WAS AGREED THAT THE PARTICIPANTS WOULD TAKE A COMMON LINE WITH THE PRESS EMPHASIZING FRANK, USEFUL AND CORDIAL NATURE OF EXCHANGE OF VIEWS. KISSINGER

DRAFTED BY: EUR:FNSPOTTS

APPROVED BY: THE SECRETARY

CLEARANCES: EUR:WJSTOESSEL, JR.
S/S:H. BARNES

EUR/RPM:SJSTREATOR
NEA:JJSISCO

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THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

War

② November 1973
0700 EST

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Subject: Recapitulation of Airlift Deliveries to Israel

Listed below are data covering US airlift deliveries to Israel as of 0830Z 2 November 1973:

Totals for 24-Hour Periods Ending 0730Z on the Day Shown*	<u>Tonnages</u>			
	<u>27 Oct</u>	<u>28 Oct</u>	<u>29 Oct</u>	<u>30 Oct</u>
By Soviets	410-564	330-456	320-432	180-252
By U.S. Mil	858	846	792	640
By El Al	370**	171	309	85
	<u>31 Oct</u>	<u>1 Nov</u>	<u>2 Nov</u>	
By Soviets	100-120***	40-48	10-12	
By U.S. Mil	739	739	579	
By El Al	52	258	148	
<u>Cumulative Totals*</u>	<u>27 Oct</u>	<u>28 Oct</u>	<u>29 Oct</u>	<u>30 Oct</u>
By Soviets	10860-13920	11190-14376	11510-14808	11690-15060
By U.S. Mil	10446	11292	12084	12724
By U.S./El Al	2686**	2857	3166	3251
	<u>31 Oct</u>	<u>1 Nov</u>	<u>2 Nov</u>	
By Soviets	11790-15810***	11830-15228	11840-15240	
By U.S. Mil	13463	14202	14781	
By U.S./El Al	3303	3561	3709	

* 0830Z commencing 28 Oct. Excluding aircraft delivered.

** Includes reconciliation of previously unreported tonnages.

*** Adjusted figure.

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U.S. Aircraft Delivered

<u>No.</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Date Delivered</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
8	F-4E	14 Oct 73	
6	F-4E	15 Oct 73	
12	C-130B	15 Oct 73	
12	F-4E	17 Oct 73	
2	F-4E	18 Oct 73	
4	F-4E	20 Oct 73	
8	A-4	21 Oct 73	
10	A-4	22 Oct 73	
7	F-4	22 Oct 73	
1	F-4	23 Oct 73	F-4 air delivery completed.
13	A-4	23 Oct 73	
5	A-4	24 Oct 73	
2	A-4	28 Oct 73	A-4 air delivery completed. 12 A-4s in transit by ship. 4 A-4s awaiting sealift in Norfolk.

Sorties

	<u>Last 24 Hours</u>	<u>Cumulative</u>
C-141	12	287
C-5	5	96
E1 A1	6	94

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F. T. BROWN
Rear Admiral, USN
Deputy Director for
Operations, NMCC

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SECRET/EXDIS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Operations Center

MIDDLE EAST TASK FORCE
Situation Report # 88

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CIA (LDX)

NSA (LDX)

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Situation Report in the Middle East as of 1800 EST, 11/2/73

UNEF/UNTSO - We have instructed our Mission in New York to tell the UN that we are prepared to have the two C-141 aircraft now in Helsinki fly to Cyprus to drop off their cargo of 79 Finnish soldiers and 17 tons of cargo for transshipment by the RAF to Cairo. The flight is expected now to take place on Saturday, November 3. We have also told the Mission to make it clear to the UN that we can make no commitment regarding future airlift operations until it has clarified the situation regarding landing rights for U.S. MAC aircraft in Egypt.

A consensus appears to be emerging in New York whereby the logistics element for the UNEF will be provided by both Canada and Poland; it will be restricted to that specific function. The non-aligned members of the SC have proposed the inclusion of contingents from Ghana, Indonesia, Nepal, Panama, and Peru, and have taken the position that the UNEF should include at least three African nations. The problem remains, however, that the most likely African donors have severed diplomatic relations with Israel, which may object to their inclusion in the UNEF on those grounds. Following Liberia's break today, Embassy Abidjan reports that there is now little hope that the Ivory Coast will be able to retain its relations with Israel.


Cease-fire - There have been no reports of significant violations on either the Suez or Golan fronts. UNTSO sources say the Syrians are pressing the Secretary General to publish their complaint that the Israelis have been taking additional territory on Mt. Hermon since the cease-fire. The Israelis have not objected to the inclusion on relief convoy trucks of gasoline to fuel the barges transporting supplies across the canal to the trapped Egyptian Third Army. Israeli and Egyptian military representatives at Suez are discussing a deal involving the release of Israeli bodies held by the Egyptians and the turning on of the Suez City

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GDS - DECLASS Dec. 31, 1981

water supply by th Israelis.

Diplomatic Activity - Secretary Kissinger held discussions this afternoon with Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister Mohammad Zakaria Ismail and is expected to hold further talks this evening with Egyptian Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmi. Presidents Sadat and Asad returned to their respective capitals from Kuwait this afternoon following their meetings there; no details are yet available. Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov is still in Cairo, and plans to go on to Damascus November 3rd before returning to Moscow. Embassy Tel Aviv reports that Abba Eban has accepted an "urgent invitation" from the Romanians to visit Bucharest and, according to the Embassy's Foreign Ministry source, participate in high level consultation with representatives of Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Sudan, Morocco, and Algeria. The source offered no other details.





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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 NEA-10 IO-14 NIC-01 SAJ-01 EUR-00

ACDA-19 PM-07 NSC-10 SPC-03 SS-20 RSC-01 CIAE-00

INR-10 NSAE-00 DODE-00 PRS-01 AF-10 DRC-01 /134
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C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 13722

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, PINT, UR
SUBJ: SOVIET LEADERSHIP ASPECTS OF MIDDLE EAST CRISIS

REF: A. MOSCOW 13666; B. MOSCOW 13416; C. MOSCOW 13615

1. SUMMARY: THE EVENTS OF THE PAST WEEKS MAY REVERBERATE FOR A LONG TIME IN SOVIET LEADING CIRCLES, RAISING QUESTIONS ABOUT DETENTE WITH THE U.S., SOVIET MILITARY POSTURE, AND THE QUALITY OF BREZHNEV'S LEADERSHIP. IF ATTENTION IS FOCUSED ON THE NIGHT OF OCTOBER 24-25 AS A U.S.-SOVIET SHOWDOWN COMPARABLE TO 1962, PROBLEMS WITHIN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP MIGHT BE SHARPENED. SUCH PROBLEMS MAY BE MITIGATED, HOWEVER, SO LONG AS THE IMPERATIVES FOR SEEKING A MORE STABLE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S. CONTINUE TO INFLUENCE SOVIET POLICY; WE SEE NO EVIDENCE OF CHANGE THUS FAR. A POSITIVE EFFECT SHOULD ALSO FLOW FROM THE CURRENT U.S. POLICY OF ACKNOWLEDGING THE SOVIET ROLE IN POLITICAL EFFORTS TOWARD A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT, FURTHER DEVELOPING BILATERAL RELATIONS, AND DOWNPLAYING THE CONFRONTATION ASPECT OF LAST WEEK'S DEVELOPMENTS. END SUMMARY.

2. SOVIET HANDLING OF THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS REFLECTS MOSCOW'S DETERMINATION TO MAINTAIN ITS PRESENCE AND TO INCREASE ITS INFLUENCE IN AN AREA WHICH IT CONSIDERS IMPORTANT FOR STRATEGIC, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REASONS.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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THIS HAS LED MOSCOW TO PLACE A HIGH PRIORITY ON THE MAINTENANCE OF A CREDIBLE POSTURE WITH THE ARABS. IT HAS ALSO MEANT EXPLOITING EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO GAIN THE LONG-BOUGHT POSITION OF EQUAL STATUS WITH THE U.S. AS AN ARBITER IN MIDDLE EAST AFFAIRS.

3. IN THIS EFFORT, THE SOVIETS PREFERRED TO AVOID DIRECT MILITARY CONFRONTATION WITH THE U.S. AND, IF POSSIBLE, UNNECESSARY JEOPARDY TO BREZHNEV'S "PEACE PROGRAM."

4. THE OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATIONS IN MOSCOW WITH THE SECRETARY ON OCTOBER 20-21 COULD THUS BE REPRESENTED BY BREZHNEV AS CONSISTENT WITH THESE AIMS. PARAGRAPH TWO OF SC RESOLUTION 338, TOGETHER WITH THE CEASE-FIRE WHICH WAS TO HALT AN ISRAELI ADVANCE, PERMITTED THE SOVIETS TO POSE AS THE DEFENDER OF ARAB INTERESTS. THE OFFER OF JOINT GOOD OFFICES FOR NEGOTIATIONS GAVE THEM A POTENTIAL EQUAL STATUS WITH THE U.S. IN HELPING THE PARTIES WORK OUT A SETTLEMENT. BREZHNEV COULD ALSO DESCRIBE THE MOSCOW TALKS AS A DEMONSTRATION OF GREAT POWER RESPONSIBILITY AND EVIDENCE OF THE CONCRETE ADVANTAGES OF DETENTE: A MAJOR TEST HAD BEEN PASSED.

5. IT IS SIGNIFICANT THAT BREZHNEV HIMSELF TOOK ON THE PRIMARY NEGOTIATING RESPONSIBILITY, INSTEAD OF DELEGATING IT TO GROMYKO, A POLITBURO MEMBER AND THE SECRETARY'S COUNTERPART, OR TO KOSYGIN, WHO HAD JUST MADE THE TRIP TO CAIRO. PRESUMABLY, HE DID SO BOTH BECAUSE HIS DETENTE POLICY WAS SO MUCH AT RISK AND BECAUSE THE POTENTIAL LAURELS WERE GREAT. WHATEVER THE REASON, HIS PRESTIGE BECAME VERY MUCH ENTWINED IN THE COURSE OF EVENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

6. THE PICTURE OF SOVIET MOTIVATIONS IN THE PERIOD BETWEEN THE SECRETARY'S VISIT TO MOSCOW AND THE U.S. ALERT IS NOT CLEAR. WE ARE NOW SEEING A SOVIET ATTEMPT TO PUT AN INNOCENT FACE ON SOVIET ACTIONS IN THAT PERIOD, BASED ON A ALLEGED SOVIET BELIEF THAT ISRAELI MILITARY ACTIONS AFTER THE FIRST CEASE-FIRE MEANT THAT THE U.S. HAD NOT FULFILLED ITS SIDE OF THE MOSCOW UNDERSTANDING (REF A). SHITIKOV'S EMOTIONAL OUTBURST TO THE AMERICAN

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JOURNALISTS (REF B) FITS THIS PATTERN.

7. IN ATTEMPTING TO LOOK BELOW THIS COVER STORY, EMBASSY WOULD GUESS THAT CONTINUED ISRAELI ADVANCES AFTER THE CEASE-FIRE HAD PUT SOVIET CREDIBILITY IN THE ARAB WORLD TO THE TEST, AND THAT BREZHNEV'S ROLE IN THE U.S.-SOVIET UNDERSTANDING HAD COME INTO QUESTION. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, IT WAS APPARENTLY DECIDED TO BRING HEAVY PRESSURE TO BEAR ON THE U.S. TO BRING ISRAEL AROUND.

8. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE AT THIS POINT TO JUDGE HOW THE SOVIETS GAUGED PROBABLE U.S. REACTIONS. PERHAPS THEY DID NOT EXPECT WASHINGTON'S ACTION TO BE AS FIRM AS IT WAS, BUT IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT THEY WOULD HAVE EXCLUDED THIS AS A POSSIBILITY. THUS, THEY MUST HAVE AT LEAST BEEN AWARE OF THE RISKS THAT THEIR ACTIONS ENTAILED, AND CONCLUDED THAT THEY NEVERTHELESS HAD TO SEEK TO SALVAGE THE SOVIET POSITION IN THE MIDDLE EAST NOTWITHSTANDING THE RISK OF A TEMPORARY SETBACK TO DETENTE. IT IS NOT INCONCEIVABLE THAT THERE WERE ARGUMENTS WITHIN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP ON THE QUESTION OF HOW TO REACT TO FAILURE OF THE FIRST CEASE-FIRE, WITH THE ARGUMENT FINALLY TILTING IN FAVOR OF HARD-LINERS, INCLUDING SOME WHO ALSO HARBORED DOUBTS ABOUT SOME ASPECTS OF DETENTE.

9. IN ANY CASE, THE REVERBERATIONS OF THE OCTOBER 24-25 DEVELOPMENTS MAY BE ECHOING FOR SOME TIME TO COME-- BOTH IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS AND WITHIN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP. THE BREZHNEV LEADERSHIP WAS IN A POTENTIALLY VULNERABLE POSITION: CRITICS COULD CHARGE THAT THIS WAS A REPLAY OF 1962, AND THAT MOSCOW AGAIN BLINKED. IF OCTOBER 1973 ACQUIRES THE SAME STIGMA OF A SOVIET BACKDOWN, THERE COULD AGAIN BE CONSEQUENCES WITHIN THE LEADERSHIP.

10. THE UNDERLYING REASONS FOR MOSCOW'S PURSUIT OF DETENTE REMAIN, AND THE EMBASSY HAS SEEN NO EVIDENCE AT THE WORKING LEVEL WHICH WOULD INDICATE OTHERWISE. WE BELIEVE BREZHNEV IS STILL COMMITTED TO THAT POLICY, AS REFLECTED IN HIS PEACE CONGRESS SPEECH, ALTHOUGH THAT SPEECH ALSO INDICATES THAT HE IS TRIMMING HIS SAILS TO

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SOME DEGREE (REF C). THE POSSIBILITY CANNOT BE OVER-LOOKED THAT HE MAY HAVE BECOME MORE VULNERABLE TO THE VIEWS OF CRITICS AS A RESULT OF MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS AND HIS INVOLVEMENT THEREIN. (IT IS NOT WITHOUT INTEREST, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT AT THE END OF A LONG FOREIGN POLICY SPEECH HE REVEALED STATISTICS OF A RECORD GRAIN HARVEST, THUS IN EFFECT CLAIMING A MAJOR ACHIEVEMENT FOR HIS LEADERSHIP.)

11. UNDESIRABLE FALLOUT CAN BE MINIMIZED BY CURRENT U.S. POLICY OF SEEKING TO EMPHASIZE THE POSITIVE AND, HAVING ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE USSR HAS A MAJOR ROLE TO PLAY IN THE MIDDLE EAST (THE GOOD OFFICES CONCEPT), TO ENGAGE MOSCOW IN A CONSTRUCTIVE, JOINT EFFORT TO ACHIEVE PEACE IN THE REGION, AT THE SAME TIME CONTINUING EFFORTS TO IMPROVE OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS. IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT WE HAVE A BETTER CHANCE OF ATTAINING THESE GOALS IF WE CONTINUE TO MINIMIZE THE CONFRONTATION ASPECTS OF THE OCTOBER 22-25 PERIOD.
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THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

War

(1) November 1973
0700-EST

MEMORANDUM FOR THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Subject: Recapitulation of Airlift Deliveries to Israel

Listed below are data covering US airlift deliveries to Israel as of 0830Z 1 November 1973:

Totals for 24-Hour Periods Ending 0730Z on the Day Shown*	26 Oct	27 Oct	28 Oct	29 Oct
By Soviets	340-480	410-564	330-456	320-432
By U.S. Mil	867	858	846	792
By El Al	212	370**	171	309
	30 Oct	31 Oct	1 Nov	
By Soviets	180-252	100-120***	40-48	
By U.S. Mil	640	739	739	
By El Al	85	52	258	
Cumulative Totals*	26 Oct	27 Oct	28 Oct	29 Oct
By Soviets	10450-13356	10860-13920	11190-14376	11510-14808
By U.S. Mil	9588	10446	11292	12084
By U.S./El Al	2316	2636**	2857	3166
	30 Oct	31 Oct	1 Nov	
By Soviets	11690-15060	11790-15180***	11830-15228	
By U.S. Mil	12724	13463	14202	
By U.S./El Al	3251	3303	3561	

* 0830Z commencing 28 Oct. Excluding aircraft delivered.
** Includes reconciliation of previously unreported tonnages.
*** Adjusted figure.

Classified by.....DDO, NMCC
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY31 Dec 1983

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U.S. Aircraft Delivered


<u>No.</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Date Delivered</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
8	F-4E	14 Oct 73	
6	F-4E	15 Oct 73	
12	C-130B	15 Oct 73	
12	F-4E	17 Oct 73	
2	F-4E	18 Oct 73	
4	F-4E	20 Oct 73	
8	A-4	21 Oct 73	
10	A-4	22 Oct 73	
7	F-4	22 Oct 73	
1	F-4	23 Oct 73	F-4 air delivery completed.
13	A-4	23 Oct 73	
5	A-4	24 Oct 73	
2	A-4	28 Oct 73	A-4 air delivery completed. 12 A-4s in transit by ship. 4 A-4s awaiting sealift in Norfolk.

Sorties

	<u>Last 24 Hours</u>	<u>Cumulative</u>
C-141	12	275
C-5	5	91
E1 A1	5	88

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MIDDLE EAST TASK FORCE
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Situation Report in the Middle East as of 1200 EST, 1 Nov 1973

S/S (3)

Ceasefire

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Israel has reported an incident in which six Egyptian soldiers were killed on the Suez-Cairo highway. Apart from isolated incidents of this sort, the ceasefire is holding well.

NEA

EB

EUR

IO

AF

AF/N

S/PRS

A/WLG

PM

INR

WH (LDX)

ODD (LDX)

CIA (LDX)

NSA (LDX)

PA/HO

L

S/CCT

SCA

SY

SCI

The Lebanese border also remains quiet. The Israelis have confirmed that the Lebanese Army is patrolling the border and one of Mrs. Meir's closest advisors has expressed the hope to Embassy Tel Aviv that Lebanese troops will remain in the area.

Reuters, quoting a UNEF spokesman, reports that a total of 45 trucks have now reached the Egyptian Third Army. The spokesman added the UNEF is now composed of 181 Austrians, 215 Finns, and 221 Swedes, with more troops expected from Sweden and Finland.

UNEF/UNTSO

Airlift of Finnish soldiers augmenting the UNEF contingent may be delayed as a result of Egyptian refusal to grant overflight and landing clearances for the USAF/MAC C-141 aircraft involved. Pick up in Helsinki is scheduled for early afternoon, EST today. This matter is being raised with the Egyptian Foreign Minister here and also with the Egyptian mission to the UN in an attempt to clear the way for use of U.S. military aircraft. Meanwhile, MAC plans to onload the Finns at Helsinki and to fly to Rhein Main in Germany, holding there pending resolution of the clearance problem.

The Air Force has determined that the JP-1 type fuel available at Cairo International Airport is the same as commercial jet fuel type A-1 which is an acceptable substitute for the normal JP-4 fuel used by C-141 aircraft. Thus, there should be no refueling problem once the clearance

*believe E9
objecting to use
of military
aircraft*

SECRET/EXDIS

GDS - DECLAS Dec. 31, 1981

SECRET/EXDIS

-2-

procedures are worked out.

UNSC Discussion of UNEF

The Security Council met this morning at 10:00 a.m. to discuss the terms of reference of the UNEF and to decide on the additional contingents necessary to bring it up to its full 7,000-man strength. ✓

APPROVED BY: _____

DEPUTY DEPT. FOR OPERATIONS

SECRET/EXDIS



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TELEGRAM

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AMCONSUL CURACAO
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S E C R E T STATE 215218

EXDIS - INFORM CONSULS

E.O. 11652:GDS
TAGS: XX
SUBJ: MIDDLE EAST SITUATION

VIENNA PASS USDEL MBFR
KUWAIT POUCH MUSCAT AND DOHA
BEIRUT PASS BAGHDAD

1. FOLLOWING IS MIDDLE EAST SITUATION THROUGH EVENING OF OCTOBER 31.

2. MILITARY SITUATION. SITUATION ON BOTH FRONTS

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SECRET

ANDERSON _____
HOLDRIDGE _____
HORMATS _____
JORDEN _____
~~KENNEDY~~ _____
LEHMAN _____
LEVINE _____
NEGROPONTE _____
ODEEN _____
RATLIFF _____
~~RONDON~~ _____
~~SAUNDERS~~ _____
~~Sonnenfeldt~~ _____
I. G. _____
VALSH _____

D/E

not a bad
wrap-up



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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
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CONTINUES TO BE GENERALLY QUIET. HOWEVER, DETAILED COMPLAINTS OF MINOR INFRACTIONS CONTINUE TO BE FILED. THERE WAS ONE REPORT OF ISRAEL DROPPING SOME PARA-TROOPS ON HILL ON SUEZ FRONT, ALTHOUGH HILL WAS ALREADY WITHIN AREA HELD BY ISRAEL.

3. FAHMI APPOINTED FOREIGN MINISTER. WIRE SERVICE REPORTS THAT SADAT HAS APPOINTED ISMAIL FAHMI FOREIGN MINISTER. ZAYYAT HAS REPORTEDLY BEEN APPOINTED PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR.
4. SECRETARY'S TRIP. THE SECRETARY'S PLANNED TRIP TO MIDDLE EAST AND OTHER LOCATIONS WAS ANNOUNCED AT NOON BRIEFING TODAY. US MISSION, NATO REPORTS THAT COUNCIL WELCOMES PLANNED BRIEFING BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO FOLLOWING THE SECRETARY'S TRIP.
5. THE MOOD IN ISRAEL. US EMBASSY, TEL AVIV REPORTS THAT PRESENT CLIMATE IN ISRAEL MAY BE CHARACTERIZED AS ONE OF CONFUSION AND APPREHENSION. THE ISRAELIS ARE NOW QUESTIONING WHETHER ISRAEL CAN WITHSTAND U.S. PRESSURES, BUT ISRAEL IS COUNTING ON MRS. MEIR'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON TO ENSURE THAT ISRAEL'S VOICE WILL BE EFFECTIVE. RELATED TO THIS, THERE ARE INCREASING STRAINS IN ISRAELI DOMESTIC POLITICS, AND CONCERN ABOUT U.S. POSITION. SOME 500 RELATIVES OF MISSING SOLDIERS AND PRISONERS OF WAR DEMONSTRATED THIS AFTERNOON NEAR THE U.S. EMBASSY IN TEL AVIV, ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORT. AN OFFICIAL U.S. SOURCE INDICATED NUMBER WAS 100-125.
6. POW LISTS. EGYPT HAS PASSED LIST OF ISRAELI POW'S TO ICRC. SYRIA HAS STATED THAT IT WILL NOT SUBMIT LISTS OF POW'S UNTIL ISRAEL CARRIES OUT GENEVA CONVENTION IN FULL. SYRIA SAID THAT FOR ITS PART, BEGIN QUOTE, IT REAFFIRMS THAT IT WILL CONTINUE TO ADHERE TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS, PARTICULARLY THE GENEVA CONVENTION INCLUDING SUBMISSION OF THE NAMES OF POW'S AND AUTHORIZING RED CROSS PERSONNEL TO VISIT THEM, END QUOTE. ISRAEL HAS SENT NAMES OF SOME 7,000

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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ARAB PRISONERS TO THE ICRC.

7. JORDANIAN FORCE IN SYRIA. IN A MESSAGE TO THE ARMED FORCES, KING HUSSEIN SAID THAT JORDANIAN TROOPS MAY RETURN HOME VERY SOON FROM SYRIA, IN VIEW OF FACT THAT FIGHTING HAS STOPPED IN SYRIA, AND ALSO THAT FORCES FROM SEVERAL OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES REMAIN IN SYRIA.
8. ALGERIAN STATEMENT ON MIDDLE EAST. AN OFFICIAL ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT STATEMENT HAILED THE EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN MILITARY ACTIONS, BEGIN QUOTE, AS HAVING RESTORED ARAB DIGNITY, AND AS AN AFFIRMATION OF ARAB WILL TO REGAIN THEIR RIGHTS BY ANY MEANS. END QUOTE. THE STATEMENT CALLS ATTENTION TO THE SOLIDARITY OF AFRICAN, NON-ALIGNED AND SOCIALIST NATIONS WITH THE ARAB CAUSE. IT STATES THAT THE, BEGIN QUOTE, ISOLATION OF ZIONISM AND ITS ALLIES MUST BE MAINTAINED AND REINFORCED UNTIL JUST AND DURABLE SOLUTION IN ME HAS BEEN ACHIEVED. END QUOTE. US-INT. ALGIERS READS THIS STATEMENT AS MEANING THAT ALGERIA WILL ACCEPT WHAT EGYPT AND SYRIA FIND ACCEPTABLE WITH REGARD TO THE CEASE-FIRE AND THE ULTIMATE DISPOSITION OF THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIES.
9. UNEF. IN PROGRESS REPORT SUBMITTED TO SECURITY COUNCIL TODAY, SEC. GEN. SAID THAT UNEF WILL BE UP TO ABOUT ONE-THIRD OF ITS EVENTUAL PROJECTED STRENGTH BY END OF FIRST WEEK OF NOVEMBER. THIS WILL BE POSSIBLE, AS RESULT OF DECISIONS TAKEN BY IRISH TO PROVIDE SOME 400 MEN AND SWEDES, FINNS, AND AUSTRIANS TO UP THEIR ADVANCE CONTINGENTS TO BATTALION STRENGTH. ON DEPLOYMENTS, WALDHEIM INDICATED THE FINNS ARE NOW ESTABLISHED IN SUEZ CITY, SWEDES IN ISMAILIA, AND AUSTRIANS IN CAIRO, WHERE THEY ARE ENGAGED IN SPECIAL TASKS, INCLUDING PATROLS SOUTHWEST OF SUEZ. EMBASSY LIMA REPORTS PERU HAS VOLUNTEERED CONTINGENT, AND EMBASSY OSLO REPORTS NORWEGIAN DISAPPOINTMENT AT NOT BEING ASKED BY THE UN TO CONTRIBUTE FORCES.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

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10. FINNISH UNEF AIRLIFT. PLANS ARE NOW WELL ADVANCED FOR THE TRANSPORT OF FINNISH PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT TO CAIRO BEGINNING ON NOVEMBER 1 WITH DEPARTURE OF FIRST FINNISH UNEF AUGMENTATION ELEMENTS NON-STOP FROM HELSINKI VIA USAF C-141S. WE HAVE ALERTED POSTS ALONG ANTICIPATED ITINERARY THAT OVERFLIGHT CLEARANCE REQUESTS ARE ON THE WAY AND HAVE QUERIED US/INT CAIRO ON POSSIBLE LIMITATIONS ON AVAILABILITY OF JET FUEL AT CAIRO INTERNATIONAL.
11. EQUIPMENT REQUESTS. WE NOW HAVE A REQUEST FROM UN FOR HEAVY EQUIPMENT IN SUPPORT OF UNEF OPERATIONS. UN WANTS TRANSPORT AND SERVICE VEHICLES (BUSES, SHOP-TRUCKS, AND PICK-UPS) ENGINEERING EQUIPMENT, WATER PURIFICATION EQUIPMENTS, ETC. AIM IS TO USE STANDARDIZED EQUIPMENT FROM START, RATHER THAN HAVING TO ACCOMPLISH STANDARDIZATION LATER AS WAS DONE IN THE PREVIOUS UNEF. KISSINGER

NOTE BY OC/T: POUCHED ABOVE ADDRESSEES.

Saunders FYI/FILES

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 1, 1973

Dear General Franco:


Your message of October 13 setting forth Spain's views on the Middle Eastern situation is appreciated. I have noted with particular interest your observations with regard to the roles that might be played by the United States and Spain.

There have been several significant developments during the past few days. As the result of intensive efforts by the United States, together with those of other countries, the United Nations Security Council has been able to adopt most important resolutions which provide a framework that could bring peace to the Middle East.

The United States fully supports the principles embodied in these resolutions, and we will devote our continuing efforts to assist in their effective implementation. However, if these measures are to succeed, they will need the support of all interested parties. It is my hope that the Government of Spain will also devote its earnest efforts to ensuring the success of the resolutions.

I value the opportunity afforded by this correspondence to emphasize the importance I attach to a whole-hearted effort by all concerned to achieve a lasting peace in the Middle East.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Richard Nixon". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

His Excellency
General Francisco Franco Bahamonde
Chief of the Spanish State
Madrid

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Operations Center

MIDDLE EAST TASK FORCE

Situation Report No. 85

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S/S (3) Situation in the Middle East, as of 1800 Hours (EDT), November 1, 1973

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S/S-M

S/S-S

S/PC

EUR

NEA

IO

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EB

S/PRS

A/WLG

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INR

WH(LDX)

DOD(LDX)

CIA(LDX)

NSA(LDX)

H

Ceasefire - According to press reports, a small breach of the ceasefire occurred this morning in the Gidi pass area of the east bank of the Canal. Israeli forces fired on a small Egyptian force which moved a short way out of the 3rd Army enclave.

The incident did not interfere with another meeting between Israeli and Egyptian officers on the West Bank at KM 101.

According to the IDF spokesman, as of 5 p.m. local time, 65 trucks had reached the 3rd Army.

UNEF/UNTSO - The USAF airlift of Finnish soldiers from Helsinki to the Middle East is still being delayed as a result of continuing Egyptian denial of landing rights to the two USAF aircraft, which are still waiting for orders in Helsinki. We have informed the UN of the problem and have discussed with the British the feasibility of our airlifting the Finns to Cyprus and transferring them there to the RAF for airlifting to Egypt. Meanwhile, USINT Cairo reports that the Egyptians have indicated no resolution of the landing clearance issue can be made before the morning of November 2, as it will require a "political decision."

UNSC Session on UNEF - According to USUN, the main issues during an informal SC meeting this morning on UNEF composition were:

- A. participation by Warsaw Pact countries; and
- B. the Israeli requirement that UNEF participants have diplomatic relations with Israelis.

There was general agreement on Panama and Nepal as contributors, but no indication as to when the SYG will request their participation. Other countries mentioned as possibilities were Peru, Ghana, Liberia, Yugoslavia, and Indonesia, but no conclusions were reached. Soviet Ambassador Malik strongly criticized the choice of Canada as the UNEF logistician, and applauded an Indonesian suggestion that logistics be handled jointly by Canada and Poland.

SECRET

-2-

The Secretary General submitted a further report, noting that more contingents are needed and that the force needs to be broadly based geographically. Even though agreement on overall composition is not yet possible, he suggested that agreement might be reached on specific contingents from Latin America, Africa, and Asia. He circulated a list of governments ready to offer contingents.

Diplomatic Activity - Prime Minister Meir met with the Secretary for two hours this morning and with the President for over an hour this afternoon. She gave a press conference at 4 p.m. During the conference PM Meir suggested that Israel and Egypt negotiate a new ceasefire line in a way that would involve moving forces on both sides of the Canal. She placed great emphasis on the POW issue and indicated she was more optimistic on this score following her talk with the President.

Meanwhile, press tickers report that President Sadat met briefly with King Faisal in Saudi Arabia before meeting in Kuwait with Syrian President Asad and Kuwaiti ruler Shaikh Sabah.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
APPROVED BY:
<i>Reginald M. Elt</i>
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS